Afriat’s theorem for indivisible goods

We identify a natural counterpart of the standard GARP for demand data in which goods are all indivisible. We show that the new axiom (DARP, for “discrete axiom of revealed preference”) is necessary and sufficient for the rationalization of the data by a well-behaved utility function. Our results complement the main finding of Polisson and Quah (2013), who rather minimally modify the original consumer problem with indivisible goods so that the standard GARP still applies.     

ARBITRAGE BOUNDS FOR PRICES OF WEIGHTED VARIANCE SWAPS

We develop a theory of robust pricing and hedging of a weighted variance swap given market prices for a finite number of co‐maturing put options. We assume the put option prices do not admit arbitrage and deduce no‐arbitrage bounds on the weighted variance swap along with super‐ and sub‐replicating strategies that enforce them. We find that market quotes for variance swaps are surprisingly close to the model‐free lower bounds we determine. We solve the problem by transforming it into an analogous question for a European option with a convex payoff. The lower bound becomes a problem in semi‐infinite linear programming which we solve in detail. The upper bound is explicit. We work in a model‐independent and probability‐free setup. In particular, we use and extend Föllmer's pathwise stochastic calculus. Appropriate notions of arbitrage and admissibility are introduced. This allows us to establish the usual hedging relation between the variance swap and the “log contract” and similar connections for weighted variance swaps. Our results take the form of a FTAP: we show that the absence of (weak) arbitrage is equivalent to the existence of a classical model which reproduces the observed prices via risk‐neutral expectations of discounted payoffs.     

Truthful germs are contagious: A local-to-global characterization of truthfulness

We study the question of which social choice functions from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes are truthful, i.e., implementable by truthful mechanisms, when utilities are quasi-linear. For convex domains, our main theorem characterizes truthful social choice functions as those satisfying two properties: local weak monotonicity and vortex-freeness. The first of these constrains the function values at any two sufficiently proximal points, while the second asserts that its line integrals around sufficiently small triangular loops must vanish.The characterization implies a local-to-global principle that allows one to deduce truthfulness of a function from its behavior on arbitrarily small neighborhoods of each point. Other consequences include a simple alternate derivation of the Saks–Yu Theorem that weak monotonicity characterizes truthfulness of functions having a convex domain and finite range, and a sufficient condition for constructing truthful functions by “stitching together” truthful subfunctions on different subsets of the domain.     

Constructive and computable Hahn–Banach theorems for the (second) fundamental theorem of welfare economics

The Hahn–Banach Theorem plays a crucial role in the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics. To date, all mathematical economics and advanced general equilibrium textbooks concentrate on using non-constructive or incomputable versions of this celebrated theorem. In this paper we argue for the introduction of constructive or computable Hahn–Banach theorems in mathematical economics and advanced general equilibrium theory. The suggested modification would make applied and policy-oriented economics intrinsically computational.     

A characterization of exact non-atomic market games

Continuous exact non-atomic games are naturally associated to certain operators between Banach spaces. It thus makes sense to study games by means of the corresponding operators. We characterize non-atomic exact market games in terms of the properties of the associated operators. We also prove a separation theorem for weak compact sets of countably additive non-atomic measures, which is of independent interest.     

CONVEX RISK MEASURES FOR GOOD DEAL BOUNDS

We study convex risk measures describing the upper and lower bounds of a good deal bound, which is a subinterval of a no‐arbitrage pricing bound. We call such a convex risk measure a good deal valuation and give a set of equivalent conditions for its existence in terms of market. A good deal valuation is characterized by several equivalent properties and in particular, we see that a convex risk measure is a good deal valuation only if it is given as a risk indifference price. An application to shortfall risk measure is given. In addition, we show that the no‐free‐lunch (NFL) condition is equivalent to the existence of a relevant convex risk measure, which is a good deal valuation. The relevance turns out to be a condition for a good deal valuation to be reasonable. Further, we investigate conditions under which any good deal valuation is relevant.     

废墟中的景观:新制度主义批判

在资产阶级经济学的各个分支中,新制度经济学可算是"此物最相思",但实际情况并非如此。所谓的古典主义—新古典主义—新制度主义,乃是资产阶级本体论意义上的虚假理论发展之路;其"虚假"就在于本体论工作预设,在于逻辑推理所依据的本体的虚假性,这样才有社会物理学→数学物理学→现象学的社会物理学的体系更迭性和知识不断翻新,而其中的话语是高度一致的物象学科(工作)语言。这种资产阶级理论为社会主观批判实践提供了"漫画",创立工作范型,巧设了批判模本,而要求研究对象规定的真正意义的去魅。     

COPENHAGEN,CANCÚN AND THE LIMITS OF GLOBAL WELFARE ECONOMICS

The rise of a global welfare economics directed at the environmental challenges facing our planet represents a new policy phenomenon. This paper examines the most ambitious attempt so far to put such economics into practice via the Kyoto Protocol and more specifically the Clean Development Mechanism of the Protocol. The Copenhagen and Cancún climate change conferences have put an end to hopes of the Protocol serving as an effective tool in the mitigation of global warming. This failure of the new global welfare economics is the result of flawed principles, not just defective implementation.     

The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing under Proportional Transaction Costs in Finite Discrete Time

We prove a version of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, which applies to Kabanov's modeling of foreign exchange markets under transaction costs. The financial market is described by a   d × d   matrix-valued stochastic process  (Π _t ) ^T _{t =0}  specifying the mutual bid and ask prices between d assets. We introduce the notion of "robust no arbitrage," which is a version of the no-arbitrage concept, robust with respect to small changes of the bid-ask spreads of  (Π _t ) ^T _{t =0}  . The main theorem states that the bid-ask process  (Π _t ) ^T _{t =0}  satisfies the robust no-arbitrage condition iff it admits a strictly consistent pricing system. This result extends the theorems of Harrison-Pliska and Kabanov-Stricker pertaining to the case of finite Ω, as well as the theorem of Dalang, Morton, and Willinger and Kabanov, Rásonyi, and Stricker, pertaining to the case of general Ω. An example of a  5 × 5  -dimensional process  (Π _t )² _{t =0}  shows that, in this theorem, the robust no-arbitrage condition cannot be replaced by the so-called strict no-arbitrage condition, thus answering negatively a question raised by Kabanov, Rásonyi, and Stricker.     

积分第一中值定理的证明与推广

本文根据积分上限函数的性质利用微分中值定理证明了积分第一中值定理,用改进的介值定理证明了ξ∈(a,b),并推广了积分第一中值定理。